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'Dicta Observes
A committee of students from the University of Denver
School of Law approached the Editorial Staff of Dicta recently
and asked for permission to "take over" our May issue. The
Editors have allowed that committee the responsibility of
selecting and editing the material herein presented, all of which
was written by members of the Senior Class.
It is to be noted that the article on the subject of copyright
law was adjudged to be the winner in the Nathan Burkan
Memorial Competition, sponsored by the American Society
of Composers, Authors and Publishers, recently conducted at
the school. This article has of necessity been condensed from
the original.

THE INFRINGEMENT OF COPYRIGHTED MUSICAL
COMPOSITIONS

C OPYRIGHT is usually defined

as the exclusive right of printing or
otherwise multiplying copies of an intellectual composition or production, and of publishing and vending the same, including the right to
prevent others from doing so.'
It has also been termed: the right of an author or proprietor of a
literary work to multiply copies of it to the exclusion of all others, 2 the
sole and exclusive right of multiplying copies of an original work of
composition,' the right of publication and reproduction of works of art
or literature,4 and the exclusive right of multiplying copies after publication. 5 Lord Mansfield said, "I use the word 'copy' in the technical sense
in which that name or term has been used for ages, to signify an incorand publishing of something intellecporeal right to the sole printing
6
tual, communicated by letters."Title seventeen of the United States Code, section one (1909) sets
out the exclusive rights which the owner of the copyright shall have in
the copyrighted work. Here for the first time is found an indication
that the rights obtained are protected against invasions other than those
contained within the terms "copying," or "printing." In subsection
113 C. J. 945.

'Palmer v. DeWitt, 47 N. Y. 532, 536.
'Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Strauss, 147 Fed. 15, 19.
'American Tobacco Co. v. Werkmeister, 207 U. S. 284, 290.
'Werkmeister v. American Lith. Co., 134 Fed. 321, 323.
'The quotation appears in 8 Pet. (U. S.) 591, 673.
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(d) there is mention of the "performance" of a copyrighted work if it
be drama, and in subsection (e) there is mention of the "performance"
publicly for profit if it be music. Therefore it is clear that the statutes
of the United States have attempted to keep up with the times in affording protection to the many and increasing types of property interests and
have allowed protection to the owners of copyrights against infringements which were not contained within the scope of the common law.
Before going further it would be well to mention that the common law
rights have been superseded by statutes in both the United States and
in England.7
The statutes of the United States have replaced the common
law, and under them there are many matters worthy of consideration.
There is no doubt that the laws of the United States pertaining to copyright apply to musical compositions. That granted, there remains the
question-what does constitute infringement of the copyright? The
normal situation would be the case where someone other than the author,
and without his permission, secured the possession of a musical composition of the author either before or after the time when it had been
presented, but after the time when the composer had obtained a copyright to it, and such other person caused it to be printed and circulated
in some form. In one case8 the court held that the copyright of two
musical compositions was not violated by the unauthorized production
and sale of music rolls by which the music of these two compositions
could be reproduced on player pianos, as such rolls were not "copies"
within the meaning of the statute. The date of the case was 1908, and
Congress in the next year amended the Act so as to place such publication
within the control of the owner of the copyright, thus affording him
protection.9 The case of F. A. Mills, Inc. v. Standard Music Roll Co. 10
was decided after the Act referred to, and dealing with the question of
whether or not the defendant had infringed the rights of the plaintiff
(where the plaintiff had given or sold to the defendant the right to use
the musical composition of the plaintiff in the manufacture of music
rolls and records) the court held that the defendant in the printing
and distribution of the words of the copyrighted musical composition
had infringed the copyright. The case shows that after the Act of
1909 the composer could protect his rights in the composition against
publication by another in the form of records or music rolls.
It would appear that by reason of the fact that since any and all
of the protection of which the author or composer may really hope to
'The cases show that there is a great deal of conflict as to this point, some holding
that the statutes destroyed the common law rights, others that the common law rights
exist independently of the statutes. See Holmes v. Hurst, 19 Sup. Ct. 606, 607, and
Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U. S. 424. The weight of authority seems to be contained

in the statement set out.
'Smith-White Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U. S. 1. See also Whitmark v. Standard Music Roll Co., 221 Fed. 376; Stern v. Rosey, 17 App. (D. C.)
562, and 13 C. J. 1148, note 19.
'Act of March 4, 1909, c. 320, section 1, 35 Stat. 1075, 17 U. S. C. A. (1926).
1223 Fed. 849.
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avail himself is derived from the statutes of the United States, a most
important phase of the study of the subject is an analysis of that part
of the Act whereunder such rights emanate. For the most part section
one of title seventeen of the United States Code is the important one
because it sets out the rights in the author or composer which are exclusive. Section (e) shows that persons complying with the Act shall have
the exclusive right: "To perform the copyrighted work publicly for
profit if it be a musical composition", and for the purpose of public performance for profit; and for the purposes set forth in section (a) 12
hereof, to make any arrangement or setting of it or the melody of it in
any system of notation or any form of record in which the thought of
an author may be recorded, and from which it may be read or reproduced: PROVIDED, * * *"13
Under this section, which has to do
with musical compositions, the author or composer would seem to have
the exclusive right to perform the acts in relation to the composition
which are set out in the statute, and to be protected against the performance of those acts by anyone else. The cases dealing with the subject
go into the question of intent, which is not mentioned in the Act. It
would naturally appear that the intent should be considered as immaterial, and so the cases have held,14 the fact of infringement having been
established. One case held that where there was an unlawful printing,
copying, etc., the facts once having been proved, the unlawful intent to
violate the act will be presumed.' 5
Even though there may appear to be irreconcilable conflict in and
between the cases dealing with intent, it is evident that there is a thread
of logic and reason which may be carried through all of them. The
common law protected the author because of the fact that the composition was a creation of his in which he had a property interest by reason
of the fact that he created the work. The statutes are not new law, but
merely a reenactment of the common law in such form as to more properly provide for the needs of today. Therefore, while the modern cases
talk about situations wherein two separate and independent compositions
are identical, some of them holding that both works should be copyrightable and others that the one copyrighted first in point of time should
be protected against the other, the strictly proper result would be that
each composition should be copyrightable and subsequently protected in
the absence of the proof of the fact of infringement, the similarity being
evidence of the fact. The weight of the evidence would depend in some
degree upon the extent of the similarity, and absolute proof of infringe"Hubbell v. Royal Pastime Amusement Co., 242 Fed. 1002, discusses the punctuation at this point and states that there should be a semi-colon inserted here, otherwise
the phrase does not make sense.
"Sec. (a), "to print, reprint, publish, copy, and vend the copyrighted work."
"The "proviso" shows that the composition must be copyrighted and published
after 1909, that the section does not apply to foreign compositions, and provides for
royalties and like matters which were not considered as pertinent to this discussion.
"Harper v. Shoppell, 26 Fed. 519; Fishnel v. Lueckel, 53 Fed. 499; Reed v.
Holliday, 19 Fed. 325.
"Journal Publishing Co. v. Drake, 199 Fed. 572.
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ment would necessarily depend on more than mere identity or similarity
alone.
The cases vary greatly in the explanation of what is necessary to
constitute an infringement. One holds that infringement consists in the
exact or substantial reproduction of an original, using such original as a
model, as distinguished from an independent production of the same
thing. 1 Others show that there actually must be some copying, 17 and
that the mere fact of similarity, or even of identity, between the two
works does not of itself make the one an infringement of the other.1s
But it is well to note that the cases do not state that there will not be an
infringement unless there is copying, nor do the cases hold that where
there is a similarity or identity, without actual proof of copying, that
there will be no infringement. There may be other evidence of fact
showing infringement, and there are means of infringement, 'to be discussed later, other than copying. Similarity has been treated by the
courts as evidence of copying,19 and where there is absolute identity, the
proof is stronger than where there is a mere similarity. In the cases of
infringement of musical copyright there is, as shown, protection given
by the statute as in the cases concerning literature, and the cases hold
that the exclusive right to print, publish, copy, and sell is infringed by
the multiplication, publication, or selling of what is a substantial copy
of the copyrighted musical work, 20 and this was the law prior to the Act
of

1909,21

under which the composer secured protection against infringe-

ment through the use of mechanical devices 22 for the reproduction of
music.
Again as to the "copying". phase, there is the further question as to
the quantity of copying which is necessary in order that the composition

may be held to be an infringement of another, previously copyrighted.
The copying must be of a substantial part, 2' and where the theme or
melody of two musical selections is substantially the same, there was
held to be an infringement even though it was shown that the result
reached by the composers was pure coincidence. 24 In another case where
the theme and the execution of the musical compositions were considerably different, if there was in fact a single phrase of music and words
which was nearly identical to that of another composition, then there
might be an infringement. Such was the case of Boosey vy. Empire
Music Corporation.25 That case is particularly illustrative of the prob"West Publishing Co. v. Edward Thompson Co., 169 Fed. 833.
"Davis v. Bowes, 209 Fed. 53.
"Stetcher Lithograph Co. v. Dunston Lithograph Co., 233 Fed. 601.
"13 C. J. 1213.
13 C. J. 1147.
'Supra, note 9.
'Supra, note 8 and cases cited therein.
"Boosey v. Empire Music Co., 224 Fed. 646; also 13 C. J., sec. 280.
'Haas v. Leo Feist, 234 Fed. 105; but see Arnstein v. Marks Music Corpn.,
82 F. (2d) 275, contra, which supports the proper result suggested above.
'See note 23, supra. Also see Hirsch v. Paramount Pictures, 17 Fed. Supp. 816,
relating to similarity of bars, accents, harmony or melody.
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lem because in each instance the words, "I hear you calling me," were
used in conjunction with music which was practically identical. In the
one instance there was a jazz or syncopated rendition given by Al Jolson,
acting a negro part, wishing for the hills of Tennessee; in the other
instance John McCormack sang another sang, the subject of which was
a man singing over the grave of his departed wife. The former, the
syncopated version, was held by the court to be an infringement of the
copyright of the latter, the latter, of course, having been copyrighted
before the former. The court said that even though the similarity extended only to the use of the particular phrase mentioned, that as far as
the untutored public was concerned, that phrase has a kind of sentiment
in both cases that causes the audiences to "listen, applaud, and to buy
copies of the song in the corridor on the way out of the theatre." But
the case is unusual in that most of the cases hold that slight similarities
will not in themselves constitute an infringement. In the cases where
the music is the same but is adapted by another to different instruments
there may be an infringement;;26 as where an opera is arranged for 28a
piano, 27 or where an orchestration is made from a piano arrangement,
or an orchestration of a composition for the piano.29 Also in the case 3
where there was an unauthorized use of either the words or music when
they were not separately copyrighted there may be an infringement.sl
It is to be noted that there have been two classes of cases which
have dealt with the problems of infringement. The one class has been
inclined to hold as to a few given facts that there is an infringement of
copyright in every like case; the other cases hold that the same few facts
may constitute an infringement of copyright. 2
It is hard to see how
any court could successfully maintain that there exists a distinct set of
rules which govern the question of infringement vel non. Ruling Case
Law states, "But there appears to be no precise rule of general application by which to determine what constitutes an infringement of a musical
copyright, although in some of the cases there have been attempts to lay
down just such rules."2 33 Undoubtedly this confusion is caused by the
fact that music is of an intangible and metaphysical nature. For instance,
in some of the cases, where the court is acquainted personally with either
of the compositions in question, as must have been the situation in the
Boosey case,2 4 the court is more willing to lay down a rule which, if
taken without a consideration of all the attending facts, may lead to
disastrous consequences in another case, the facts of which are dissimilar.
In other cases, where the court may not be so well informed as to the
music, the result will be more cautious, and therefore better law. The
'D'Almaine v. Boosey, 4 L. J. Exch. 21, 221.
'Wood v. Boosey, 3 Q. B. 223.
'The Mikado Case, 25 Fed. 183.
"Chappell v. Columbia Graphophone Co., 2 Ch. 124.
8°Standard Music Roll Co. v. Mills, 241 Fed. 360; also note 8, supra.
'See note 19 in 13 C. J. 1148 for the reasons for contrary holdings.
"Hirsch v. Paramount Pictures, supri, note 40.
'6 R. C. L., Section 64.
'Supra, note 23.
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question of infringement is, as has been shown, one of fact, and, as in
the determination of negligence in tort cases, there are may factors which
may contribute to a finding by the court or jury that there is, or is not,
present in the case, infringement.
Another phase of the infringement of musical copyright is that of
the performance of the copyrighted musical selection by some person who
has no authority from the owner to do so. This aspect is also covered
in the statute. The history of the law shows that this type of infringement was neither recognized nor protected against prior to the Act of
1897. 3' This was based upon the concept that an acoustical rendition
was not "copying, publishing, or selling."36 But the law was changed,
as was shown in the discussion of White-Smith Music Publishing Co.
v. Apollo, 37 so as to place musical compositions on an equal footing
with dramatic works. The present law is (based on statute, of course)
that the owner of the copyright has the exclusive right to perform the
copyrighted work publicly for profit if it be a musical composition and
for the purpose of public performance for profit.3 8 It is interesting to
note that in the cases involving the unauthorized performance of a copyrighted work there is a susceptibility of proof in greater detail than in
those where a writing was copied. This situation arises because there is
often no concrete or permanent record from which the proof may be
derived, except in the cases dealing with music rolls, records, and the
like, mentioned before, and is, perhaps, one of the reasons why this type
of infringement was not recognized before the time of the Act.
The cases, however, influenced by the Act show that where there
has been a performance acoustically represented which, if when it was
reduced to writing would constitute an infringement, the performance
itself would be an infringement, 39 provided that the performance was in
public4 ° and for profit.4 1 The cases have shown that where there was a
performance in a restaurant or dining room by the employees of the
proprietor thereof, without charge, that there was a violation of the
exclusive right of the owner of the copyright to perform the composition
publicly for profit.42 The same case reported in another place held that
the performance of a dramatico-musical composition need not be for
profit to infringe the copyright. 43 It also holds that there may be an
infringement of a dramatico-musical composition or work where there
is an unauthorized performance of but a part of it, for instance, where
there is lacking the usual stage setting. On the other hand, the case of
John Church Co. u. Hilliard Hotel Co. 44 indicates that there must be
"Act January 6, 1897 (20 St. L. 481).
'Mikado case, supra; Stern v. Rosey, 17 App. (D. C.) 562.
'Supra, note 8.
,13 C. J. 1148; also Hubbell v. Royal Pastime Amusement Co., cited in note 11,
supra.
"See 13 C. J. 1147, sec. 320, notes and text.
'0 Boosey v. Wright, 1 Ch. 122.
'Jobn Church Co. v. Hilliard Hotel Co., 221 Fed. 229.
OHerbert v. Shanley Co., 242 U. S. 591.
"222 Fed. 544, reversing the Herbert case, supra, note 42.
"Supra, note 41.
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BOTH the performance in public and the element of profit, as does the
case of M. Witmark & Sons v. Pastime Amusement Co. 45 In the former
of the last two cases there was no admission charged for entrance into the

room wherein the music was played, while in the latter it was played in a
movie house. Thus the facts may be a ground for distinguishing the
two cases which seemingly support one another. Other cases have held
that the playing of the chorus of a composition may constitute infringement,46 and that the absence of sheet music during the performance
should make no difference. 47 Most of the cases, including the modern
ones, as will be shown, seem to insist on the profit element, but are willing to go to the greatest extremes in the finding of that element.
One most interesting phase in the acoustical performance classification, and one which is more modern in origin than the others, is the infringement of copyright through radio broadcasting. The first matter
to consider is whether or not when there is a simple broadcast, solely for
the purposes of broadcasting, and not for the purposes of advertising,
there is such performance of the copyrighted musical selection as will
constitute a performance "for profit.- 48 While the cases are not uniform
on the point, the Circuit Court of Appeals has decided the matter in the
affirmative, and this ruling49 has been generally accepted by the broadcasters as the true statement of the law. Because there would in all probability be a lessening in the value of the composition to the composer,
even though it could not be shown that any gain, benefit, or profit resulted to the broadcaster through such use of the property of another,
any diminution in the value of the property ought to be a basis for
protection.
A significant problem, derived from the foregoing, arises when
there is a public performance of a copyrighted musical selection at a cafe
or other place, with the consent of the composer. Is a broadcasting company in the broadcasting of such program obliged to obtain a "fresh"
or new consent from the pwner of the copyright? Or is it, on the other
hand, a case where the first authorization creates a sort of implied license
in the broadcaster? Mr. Stephen Davis in his work, "The Law of Radio
Communication,- 50 intimates that the question is still open. It would
appear that, because of the fact that the common law rights of authors
are the basis and background of copyright law, such performance by
the broadcasting company would be a violation of the owner's right of
property in the composition. There is one case which has, more or less,
answered the query suggested by Mr. Davis, viz., Fred Waring V.WDAS
Broadcasting Station,5" in which case the court did not deal with the
question of copyright as such, but based its decision on the right to
'298 Fed. 470, affirmed in 2 F. (2d) 1020.
"Idem.
'Leo Feist v. Demarie showing that playing "by ear" may constitute infringement.
'See Stephen Davis, "Law of Radio Communication," McGraw-Hill Book Co.
(1927), Chapter VIII.
'"Idem, at page 159.
'Supra, note 48. .
"194 At. 631 (Oct. 8, 1937, Penn.).
4
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privacy and on unfair competition. That case was one where Waring
had made several recordings, on each of which was printed, "Not licensed for radio broadcasting." The station obtained the permission of
the owners of the copyright and proceeded to broadcast the records. The
52
court pointed out

the common law rights of authors and the like,

showed that protection should be afforded, and granted an injunction. 53
Mr. Davis also says that the courts at first questioned whether the copyright laws 54 would cover radio broadcasting, but that they soon held

that the application of the statutes to situations not actually anticipated
by the legislative body is not without precedent, 55 and then held that the
broadcasting of music was, under a fair interpretation of the statute, a
public performance.58
The matter of the necessity for profit in the determination of the
question of whether there is an infringement of copyright is one as to
which the cases have been in conflict. The older ones had to do, for the
most part, with situations where there was little or no difficulty in finding the element of profit; but in the broadcasting cases the courts found
that the profits could be indirect, or, that there could be a profit found
even in the cases where there was no direct charge made. 57 In the case
of Herbert v. Shanley5 the court was faced with the difficulty of determining the point at which the profit derived from the performance became so indirect as not to constitute an infringement. In spite of the
fact that any performance of the work of another before the public does,
as has been shown, constitute a violation of his right in the property, the
cases dealing with the radio problem are rather insistent that the element
of profit be present before there will be held to be a violation of the copyright. In the statute5 9 under section (e) the phrase, "public performance
for profit," is used in two different places. It is, perhaps, because most
of the cases have been decided under section (e) that we encounter the
profit element so frequently. The Act, therefore, would seem to be of
faulty construction as evidently it does not give the full protection to
the owners of the copyrights which the courts have for so long expected.
Perhaps the solution would lie in the application of the theory used in
the libel and slander cases where the medium was radio. The cases 60 there
involved show that radio broadcasting is a publication, and that theory
in conjunction with the exclusive rights given in the statutes as to publication 6l ought to lead to a better result than has been attained.
"'51 Harvard Law Review

Quarterly).

171; See also 37 The Brief 99

(Phi Delta Phi

'The case deals with the rights of the performer, not the composer.
"Title 17, U. S. C. A.. supra.
"Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U. S. 55.
"See Chappell v. Assoeiated Radio, cited 39 Harvard L. R. 269.
"Harms v. Cohen, 279 Fed. 276.
"242 U. S. 591.
"Supra.
'State v. Haffer, 162 Pac. 45; see also Davis, "The Law of Radio Communication," supra, Chapter X.
'Supra, note 12.
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Nevertheless the cases have held that the broadcasting of a copyrighted musical selection will constitute a performance for profit,6 2 and
we shall therefore deal with the situation as it actually exists, and not as
it should. The case of Jerome Remick & Co. v. American Automobile
Accessories-3 was one in which the defendant maintained a radio station
as an incident of its business, and the expense of maintaining the station
was carried on the books of the company as advertising expense. The
company broadcast without the authority of the owner, the plaintiff, a
selection which had been copyrighted, and the court held that the broadcasting consisted in a public performance for profit, a violation of the
rights of the plaintiff. In other words the case was one in which the
court found that the profit was direct enough to sustain the action. The
Shanley case 64 held the same way, and the court there laid down the rule
that an unlicensed performance for the entertainment of patrons of a
commercial establishment is actionable even though no admission fee is
charged. The results of these cases show that the courts have gotten
away from the idea that the profit had to be direct, and that indirect
profits would suffice. This factor would seem to create far-reaching liabilities in the performance of copyrighted works in restaurants, saloons,
dance halls, and shops, without the authority of the composer
The
most of these problems, however, are handled as much as possible by the
publishers in their license agreements with the composers and performers.
At this point in the development of the law we come to the case of
Buck v. Jewell-La Salle Realty Co.,6 5 which marks a most liberal attitude
toward the protection of the rights of authors and composers. That was
a case where the defendant maintained in his hotel a master radio receiving set with loud speakers in the various public and private rooms. With
this set the defendant received for the benefit of the guests of the hotel
selections of copyrighted music which were unlawfully broadcast. The
court held that this action on the part of the defendant constituted a
public performance and was a violation of the copyright of the plaintiff.
The case marks a departure from cases such as Buck v. Duncan,6 6 which
held that in such a situation there was not a public performance for profit,
Holmes v. Hurst,6 7 wherein Dr. Holmes lost his copyright to "The Autocrat of the Breakfast Table," and the White-Smith Music Co.68 case, all
'Supra, note 48.
-5 F. (2d) 1020.
'Supra, note 58.
"283 U. S. 191 (1931) ; see also Witmark U Sons v. Bamberger, 291 Fed. 776;
Remick v. General Electric, 16 F. (2d) 829, to the same effect, and Remick v. American Automobile, supra.
"32 F. (2d) 366 (1929), modified in 51 F. (2d) 730; see also 43 Harvard
Law Review 318.

'"174 U. S.82.
"Supra, note 8. Other cases as to what performance is necessary are: Irving
Berlin v. Daigle, 31 F. (2d) 852 (cinema) : Witmark E4Sons v. Calloway, 22 F. (2d)
412 (theatre) ; Buck v. Heretis, 24 F. (2d) 876 (restaurant), all of which show that
playing of records, etc., may constitute infringement.
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of which cases indicate that at one time the United States Supreme Court
took a very narrow view of the situation. The Jewell case, as will be
noted, deals with the situation where the broadcast received was originally not authorized to be broadcast. In another case 69 the court held
that where the broadcast was licensed, then the reception would not
constitute infringement, and this factor may be of use in distinguishing
many of the cases which are seemingly inconsistent.70
Although the opinion has been expressed that the result of the
Jewell case is a happy one, still the eventual outcome may be in the other
direction. Take, for instance, the practical result of the problem. In
the first place the situation is not always the one where the composer
wishes to bring an action against another for the infringement of the
copyright of his work. There are many instances in which the composer
would be only too willing to h.ve someone "plug" his composition for
him in order that it may become popular, enabling him to receive royalties at some future date. With the result of the Jewell case and many
of the other cases there will be a great reluctance to provide entertainment
for guests and others through means which may result in legal liability.
Therefore, while the cases afford a broader protection for the authors
and the composers, still the effect may be a lessening of royalties.
No attempt has been made herein to deal in detail with the problems concerning sound moving pictures or other forms of performance,
such as victrola records, because of repetition of the principles which
have already been expressed in relation to music rolls and radio; only
the fact situations differ greatly.
The study of the law of copyrights shows several characteristics.
In the first place it concerns the protection of property rights developed
under the common law. In the second place it deals with the application
of situations and questions of fact to statutes which are extensions of the
common law. In the third place it is badly in the need of such reform
as will eanable the layman to anticipate, at least in some degree, the possible results of his participation in the use of the property protected. The
reform is coming about slowly, but until some codification is developed,
the effect of which will be the clarification of the principles to be followed, the law will always be behind the social need for it.
DUDLEY W. STRICKLAND, JR.
"Buck v. Debaum, 40 F. (2d) 734. The case also holds that the mere actuation
of an instrument to produce sounds may not be infringement.
"°Further material on Jewell Case: 9 Ore. L. R. 182; 29 Mich. L. R. 1076.

A VOICE FROM THE GRAVE
DYING DECLARATIONS IN COLORADO

THE hearsay rule in the law of evidence has long been subject to important exceptions which have more or less vitiated it so that it no
longer retains its original vigor. The general rule is that statements
made by one not a party in interest, of one not a party to the proceeding
and not made under oath are inadmissible since such statements are not
subject to cross-examination, are not spoken under the sanction of an
oath, and there is no opportunity to investigate the speaker's character
and motives or to observe his deportment on the witness stand. An
important exception to this rule is the exception by which dying declarations are admissible.
The dying declaration as an exception to the hearsay rule arose in
the first half of the eighteenth century when the hearsay rule itself was
being systematically recognized and enforced. From that time until
about 1800 any person's dying declaration could be used in any case, the
theory being that since the person was dead at the time of the trial and
his testimony unavailable, his declaration, of necessity, should be received. There was no distinction between civil and criminal cases. Thus
McNally, Evidence (1802) P. 381, 386, states: "In civil cases the rule
of receiving as evidence the dying declaration of a person 'in extremis'
hath also been adopted, and on the same principle as in criminal cases."
Swift, Evidence ( 1810) is to the same effect.
A distinction between civil and criminal cases was suggested by
counsel in Craig dem. Annesley v. Angelsea, 17 How. St. Tr. 1161
(1733) (ejectment), but the absence of a settled distinction was conceded in 1744 by Mr. Chute arguendo in Omichund v. Barker, 1 Atk. 38
(Eng.), a contract case.
Today the rule has come to be that a dying declaration is admissible
in cases of homicide only, where the murdered person is the declarant,
and the declarationis made under a sense of impending death. This restriction arose from a textbook, Pleas of the Crown, by East (1803)
in which (vol. 1, p. 353) the author stated that in homicide cases, dying
declarations were admissible. Although this statement was made in a
chapter on homicide, it was not intended to refer only to homicide cases,
but, unfortunately, a few nisi prius courts took the language as stating
a general rule and thus the declaration came to be limited to homicide
cases only. Finally, in 1860, a note by Chief Justice Redfield in his
edition of Greenleaf's Treatise on Evidence gave the rule the widest credit
and led to its general adoption. Redfield said that the necessity of apprehending murderers in homicide cases was the true ground for the rule,
and that only this grave necessity overcame such objections to the hearsay
rule as the lack of cross-examination and the admission of a statement
not made under oath. This note shows how the necessity principle was
changed from one allowing dying declarations to be admitted because
the testimony of the deceased was not available, to one allowing the declaration only where the court felt some social purpose would be served
thereby.
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Between 1806 and 1874 all the courts gradually adopted the restrictive rule in force generally throughout the Uniteai States and England
today.
Colorado has followed the general rule as to the admission of dying
declarations, as is illustrated by decisions on the point hereafter set out.
The only exception to the rule in Colorado was announced in Clarke v.
People, 16 Colo. 5 11, in which the court allowed a dying declaration
where the crime of causing an abortion was charged. In this case the
court, without discussion, allowed a statement made by the deceased "in
extremis" as to the cause of her condition, without apparently realizing
that it was departing from the general rule. No other case involving
this point has since arisen in Colorado, but in other cases the court has
followed the orthodox rule. Thus in Mora v. People, 19 Colo. 255,
and Brennan v. People, 37 -Colo. 256, our court held that a dying declaration is admissible only where the death of the declarant is the subject
of a charge of homicide in a public prosecution; that it must be made
when the declarant is under a sense of impending death, and that it can
only relate to circumstances preceding the homicide.
This rule was slightly restricted in Zipperian v. People, 33 Colo.
134, again a homicide case, wherein the court held that it was error to
refuse an instruction that a dying declaration is to be given the same
weight as is given to a statement of a witness not subject to cross-examination. This case also stressed the fact that the dying declaration was
an exception to the hearsay rule, and therefore the defendant could not
object on the ground that he had no opportunity to cross-examine or
confront the witness. The early cases of McBride v. People, 5 Colo.
App. 91, and Graves v. People, 18 Colo, 170, stated that if the person
expected to recover, the declaration was inadmissible, since the reason for
the admission was that approaching death made the truth of the statement probable. The McBride case also set forth the restriction that the
declaration cannot be made in answer to questions put to the declarant,
because a declaration must be absolutely uninfluenced.
In Weaver v. People, 47 Colo. 617, the court explained the rule
further by stating that the fact that the deceased knew he was under
sense of impending death could be inferred from circumstances. Subsequent Colorado cases applied the rule to slightly different situations.
Davis v. People, 77 Colo. 546, stands for the proposition that the declaration is admissible even if the facts can be shown otherwise. Salas v.
People, 5 1 Colo. 461, put declarations on the same basis as other witness
statements by allowing an impeachment by showing other inconsistent
dying declarations. Jamison v. People, 52 Colo. 11, stated a peculiar
limitation in that it held the statement, "He murdered me," "--is only
opinion and therefore inadmissible." This case seems a super-refinement
of judicial logic. Davis v. People, supra, stated that a dying declaration
is admissible to prove defendant's innocence as well as his guilt.
Other cases in accord with the above are Garcia v. People, 64 Colo.
172; Harris v. People, 55 Colo. 407; Flor v. People, 73 Colo. 403;
Reppen v. People, 95 Colo. 192, all illustrating the orthodox rule.
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This rule, that dying declarations are limited to homicide and abortion cases and then only where the deceased is the declarant, and is under
a sense of impending death, was finally abrogated in Colorado in 1937.
Chap. 145, Session Laws of 1937, provides that dying declarations are
admissible in all civil and criminal cases and other proceedings before
courts, commissions, and other tribunals, to the same extent and for the
same purpose that they might have been admitted if the deceased had
survived and been sworn as a witness, subject only to these restrictions:
( 1 ) that at the time of making the declaration the deceased was conscious
of approaching death and believed there was no hope of recovery; (2)
that the declaration was voluntarily made and not through persuasion
of any person; (3) that the declaration was not made in answer to questions calculated to lead the deceased to make any particular statement;
(4) that the declarant was of sound mind at the time of making the declaration.
This statute puts Colorado in a unique position among the states.
The statute was intended to prevent the result of a case such as Saum v.
Friberg, 82 Colo. 395, a custody case in which the court refused to admit
a mother's dying declarations as to the moral character of the father of
the children, the statements referring to the unhappy married life of
deceased caused by the moral unfitness of the father.
This case was characterized by Wigmore as one which makes our
American law of evidence the laughing stock of the civilized world, and
it is to Colorado's credit that we are among the foremost to aid in changing the general American rule. Several other states have taken slow
steps in the same direction. Oregon and North Carolina allow by statute
dying declarations in civil suits for wrongful death as well as in homicide
cases. Kansas by judge-made law has allowed dying declarations in
civil cases as well as homicide cases (Thurston v. Fritz, 91 Kan. 468,
138 Pac. 625) in a very fine decision in which the true adaptive spirit
of the common law is beautifully illustrated.
Colorado, however, has taken the full step and, in keeping with
the present tendency toward more liberal rules in the admission of evidence and a more logical system of law, has allowed dying declarations
in all cases.
It would seem that if dying declarations are admitted in homicide
cases where the accused stands charged with his life, they should also be
admissible in cases where only property is concerned or in cases where a
crime less than murder is charged. Indeed, if any objection be made in
principle to the admission of dying declarations it would seem that it
would be to such admission in homicide cases, rather than in ordinary
civil suits. Since we have long considered that death is a sufficient insurer
of truth in homicide declarations and have left their weight for the jury,
it seems logical and better suited to an investigation for the truth such
as every trial should be, to allow all evidence to go to the jury and make
it the ultimate determinative of truth and falsehood. The Colorado
statute is sound and should give this state the basis for a sound law of
evidence as well as providing an experimental laboratory from whose
CHRISTOPHER T. O'NEILL.
findings all the states may profit.

THE BODY POLITIC COMES TO COURT
EQUITABLE PROTECTION OF POLITICAL RIGHTS

IN

VENTURING upon a consideration of equitable intervention in
Colorado in protection of political rights, attention should first be
directed to the distinction between equity writs and the common law
writs of mandamus and quo tuarranto, since where relief at law is adequate there is no need of equitable intervention.
Mandamus is in no sense an equitable proceeding, but a common
law remedy to compel performance of a legal duty, and it issues only for
the enforcement of a clear and specific legal right.- It is a summary writ
issuing, commanding an official to perform a specific legal duty which
the party applying is entitled of legal right to have performed. 2 The
reasoning that writs of mandamus, which command, and writs of injunction, which restrain, are the converse or reciprocal of one another, is
correct in many cases but not all,3 and where the former lies the latter
should not issue if all rights can be determined in the legal proceedings.'
Quo warranto, on the other hand, as defined by Blackstone, is a
writ against one who claims or usurps any office or franchise or liberty,
to inquire by what authority he supports his claim to determine the
right. 5 In most cases of violations of political rights, the remedy at law
is adequate," but where it is not, protection of public rights may demand
the injunction in equity, 7 and it is on this principle equity functions in
Colorado."
The principle of universal application that an injunction will not
issue when its object is to try title to a public office, has been well established in Colorado. "That a court of equity has not jurisdiction to try a
disputed title to a public office is too clear for argument." 9 If, however,
the controversy involves rights of franchise, or the rights of the state in
a sovereign capacity, 1 or if the claimant holds a certificate of election
seeking injunctive relief until title is determined by quo warranto proceedings," equity should intervene, as dicta of Colorado decisions seem
to indicate, where irreparable injury or conservation of great public interests are involved. However, disapproval of intervention even in such
cases is expressed in People v.District Court of Elbert County, 46 Colo.
'6 A. L. R. Digest 6435.
'People ex rel. Dean v. County Commissioners, 6 Colo. 202 (1882).
'People ex rel. v. McClees et al., 20 Colo. 403, 38. P. 468 (1894); Orman
et al. v. The People ex rel. Cooper, 18 Colo. App. 302, 71 P. 430 (1903).
'Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, Vol. 4 (4th Ed., 1919), p. 4053; Walsh on
Equity (1930), p. 278.
:See People ex rel. Barton v. Londoner, 13 Colo. 303, 22 P. 764 (1889).
'Bispham's Principles of Equity (11th Ed., 1931), p. 26.
'Walsh on Equity (1930), p. 280.

'As to the validity of distinction between these common law remedies and injunctive relief labels in code states, see Walsh on Equity (1930), at page 279.
'People v. The District Court, 29 Colo. 277, 280, 68 P. 224 (1901) ; see also
Town of Pagosa Springs v. The People, 23 Colo. App. 479, 490, 496, 130 P. 618
(1913).
"People v. McClees, 20 Colo. 403, 38 P. 468, 26 L. R. A. 646 (1894).
"Note 9. supra; Lawrence on Equity Jurisprudence (1929), p. 75.
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1, 101 P. 777 (1909), in which the court says, "It is keenly regretted,
in light of the Hinkley case (note 9), supported by such sound reasons
* * * that trial courts still decline to follow it, but persist in undertaking to adjudicate these questions in equitable suits, making applications
like this not only possible, but absolutely necessary for public protection,
to the hindrance, annoyance, and humiliation of all concerned."
The injunction to restrain unauthorized acts by public officials in
discharge of their duties, just as mandamus is used to supply defects and
to compel performance of official acts, cannot issue against an executive
officer to restrain execution of administrative acts within the scope of his
authority, since it would be contrary to our theory of government of
separation of powers for the judicial department to interfere with the
reasonable discretion of the executive. 12 But where there is no discretion
involved, both law and equity will interfere without hesitation;"3 however, no injunction will issue against the execution of an authorized discretionary order. 14 It is manifestly sound that the injunctive process
should be bound by the same limitations of the common law writ of
mandamus, for to assume jurisdiction to control the exercise of executive
or political powers or to protect individuals in the employment of purely
political rights, would be to invade the domain of other departments of
the government.' 5 An injunction "has been denied on grounds of expediency in many cases where the remedy at law is confessedly not adequate.
This occurs whenever a dominant public interest is deemed to require that
the preventive remedy, otherwise available for protection of private
rights, be refused and the injured party left to such remedy as the courts
of law may afford.""'
While it is properly held equity may not restrain
passage of legislation because of the separation of powers, dicta in Lewis

v. Denver City Waterworks Co., 19 Colo. 236, 34 P. 993 (1893), indicates that on a showing that irreparable injury will immediately result
"Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, Vol. 4 (4th Ed., 1919), p. 4062; Giles v.
Harris, 189 U. S. 475, 488 (1902) ; Brandeis' dissenting opinion in Truax et al. v.
Corrigan et al., 257 U. S. 312, 374 (1921); Mississippi v. Johnson, 4 Wall. 475
(1867). But see Greenwood Cemetery Land Co. v. Routt, 17 Colo. 156, 28 P. 1125,
15 L. R. A. 369 (1892), a mandamus proceeding holding that the powers and duties
which the governor, as a member of the state board of land commissioners, exercises in
relation to issuance of patents to purchase are not political functions which solely appertain to the executive and are therefore subject to judicial control.
"Kendall v. United States, 13 Peters 524, 9 L. Ed. 1181 (1838), where mandamus issued to compel performance of purely ministerial acts; Pueblo ZI A. V. R. Co.
v. Board of Prowers County, 5 Colo. App. 129, 38 P. 112 (1894), holding an
injunction would lie to restrain the board from interfering with fencing a right of
way obstructing a public road, the existence of which the railroad company denied.
"Frost v. Thomas, 26 Colo. 222, 56 P. 899 (1899), refusing to restrain the
executive from executing a law merely because it is alleged to be unconstitutional;
reaffirmed in People v. District Court, 29 Colo. 182, 191 (1901).
"Lawrence on Equity Jurisprudence (1929), p. 74; Taylor v. Kercheval, 82
Fed. 497 (1897).
"Apart from damages to the individual, relief from a great political wrong, if done, by the people of a state and the state itself, must be given by them
or by the legislative and political department of the government of the United States."
Giles v. Harries, 189 U. S. 475, 488 (1902).
"See Truax v. Corrigan, note 12, supra; Lawrence on Equity Jurisprudence
(1929). p. 988.
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from the passage of a municipal ordinance, an injunction will issue to
restrain the passage of the ordinance which is within the powers conferred on the mayor and trustees, if such would impair the obligation of
contract.
In general, a public officer may be restrained in a case coming under
some recognized head of equity jurisprudence, from acting illegally to the
injury of individuals.1 ' "In application for relief by injunction against
the acts of public officials, the material question, generally speaking, is,
whether they are acting within the scope of their authority, or whether
they are transcending their authority. If they are doing the latter, and
the resulting injury is not susceptible of reparation by proceedings at
law, they may be enjoined from the commission of such illegal act * * *
It is true * * * that the judicial department of the state has no power
by injunction to control an official in the exercise of his official functions
of a governmental and executive nature' s * * * but here the defendant
was doing an act the law prohibits him from doing."' 9 An extension
of this principle is found in Speyer v.School District No. 1, City and
County of Denver, 82 Colo. 534, 261 P. 859 (1927), which was a
suit brought to enjoin enforcement of an order of a school official. On
allegations of bad faith and malice on the part of the official, the court
held sufficient equities were present to warrant granting injunctive relief
to preserve the complainants' business interests. At page 539 the court
said, "if the rule is a reasonable one and made in good faith * * *
it is of no consequence that it injures plaintiff's enterprises or that the
defendants are glad that it does so; but when * * * the officer acts in
bad faith, with malice, and from no purpose or motive except to injure
another, the case is different."
The question then presents itself: Is it essential that a property
right exist before equity, in Colorado, will take jurisdiction to determine
a political issue? Whether such is absolutely necessary for equity to entertain jurisdiction in any suit may be questioned; 2 0 however, authority
looks to the historical requisite of a property right, and where such
exists, though the validity of some political action will be determined in
order to decide the existence of a property right, the courts do not hesi"See Colorado decisions, note 13, supra; Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, Vol. 4
(4th Ed., 1919), p. 4049.
"People ex rel. Alexander v. District Court, 29 Colo. 182 (1901).
1City and County of Denver v. Pitcher, 54 Colo. 203, 224, 129 P. 1015
(1913), cited with approval in Elkins v. Milliken, Secretary of State, 80 Colo. 135,
249 P. 655 (1926).
'International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U. S. 215, 39 Sup. Ct. 68,
2 A. L. R. 293 (1918), unfair competition restrained; American Mercury, Inc. v.
Chase et al., 13 F. (2d) 224 (1926), enjoining threats of criminal prosecution.
"While the cases abound in dicta to the effect that a 'property right' must be shown,
there seem to be few actual decisions denying relief on the ground that no such property
right was shown," Cook's Cases on Equity (2nd Ed., 1932), note 50, p. 266.
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22
tate to act. 21 In City and County of Denver v. Pitcher other equities
than the illegal acts of the assessor in making a horizontal reduction of
an assessment are difficult to find, the suit being entertained on behalf of
a taxpayer in his own right. Existence of a property right in an action
brought by a taxpayer to restrain by injunction a misapplication of
public funds2 3 or in an action for preliminary injunction to restrain
holding a local election in which fraud was used in obtaining the petition 2l seems fanciful. Lack of any substantial property right is apparent
in suits by taxable inhabitants and property-holders resorting to equity
to restrain misappropriation of public funds, but the propriety of entertaining such suits cannot be denied, since the bill must be filed by the
complainants on behalf of themselves and all others in the same situation." Thus, the actions are analogous to actions in protection of public
interests against public nuisances which endanger public health and
morals, involving protection of no property right, but lacking an adequate remedy at law to protect the same. "Surely the jurisdiction in the
sense of power to act exists in the courts of equity in these cases. The
exercise of that power (however) should be strictly limited to cases
where public interests demand its exercise, and petty matters of party
of expediency should be left to party organizations
politics as a matter
2 6
and the voters."Entertaining such suits in Colorado has been well established under
the constitutional provision, Art. 6, Sec. 11, providing that district
courts have original jurisdiction of all causes, both at law and equity.
In an action to enjoin the city council from issuing liquor licenses, on
allegation that the local option was fraudulently conducted, the district
court took jurisdiction, involving the validity of the election, under a
consideration of justice and duty to a majority of legal voters, holding
that "a plain, natural interpretation of the language of section 11 supports the fullest exercise of equity powers in the district court in this
proceeding. ' ' 27 The liberality of the court in placing such a construction
on the Constitution is apparent in the decision. At page 489 of the
decision the court said, "If under the early practice of the courts of equity
they assumed the right to meet every new situation wherein the lave was
inadequate, and to extend their jurisdiction to new subjects or controver-

"32 C.J.41, 254, 274; Town of Pagosa Springs v. The People, 23 Colo. App.
479, 490, 130 P. 618 (1913): Walsh on Equity (1930), p. 278; Pomeroy's
Equity Jurisprudence, Vol. 4 (4th Ed., 1919), p.4049.
'Note 18, supra; compare Coleman v.Board of Education of Emanuel County,
131 Ga. 643, 63 S. E. (1908), where the court determined collaterally the legality
of a tax election so it could determine a property right; 9 Col. Law Rev. 359.
"Leckenby v. Denver Post, 65 Colo. 443, 176 P. 490 (1918), a bill by a
taxpayer to restrain payment of money under an illegal appropriation by the general
assembly.
1 Colo. App. 199, 202
'Dicta, Ernest Guebelle et al.v. John J. Epley et al.,
(1891).
'Packard et al. v. Board of County Commissioners of Jefferson Co., 2 Colo. 338,
"The general rule would require that all taxpayers should be made
350 (1874).
parties to the suit, but as this is impracticable the law will admit one or more to sue
on behalf of themselves and others." Cited with approval in Elkins v. Milliken,
8Q Colo. 135, 249 P. 655 (1926). 2 80
.
"Walsh on Equity (1930), p.
'Town of Pagosa Springs v. The People ex rel., 23 Colo. App. 479, 486, 504,
130 P. 618 (1913).
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sies not previously known to have been of equitable cognizance, what
good reason can be given why modern courts of equity may not follow
the same practice? The very gravamen of the case at bar is fraud * * *
which has always been of equitable cognizance."
It seems unfortunate
that the court rested its conclusion on the constitutional provision, rather
than on a frank recognition of the inherent power to prevent consummation of a wrong which would otherwise go unredressed; it is likewise
unfortunate that the court proceeded to say that the question involved
was not totally political, for if the court was given jurisdiction by the
Constitution over such matters, then that alone would be determinative. 28
The decision, in reality, was based on the principle announced in McCrary on Elections, Sec. 389, which was quoted by the court: "An
adequate remedy will always be found, either at law or equity, for frauds
perpetrated against the purity of elections. If the result has been secured
by fraud, and the statute has provided no mode of redress, it by no means
follows that no redress can be had.'"'2
Extension of this principle to enjoin the holding of an election for
municipal incorporation was denied on grounds of want of jurisdiction
(apparently not in the strict sense, but on a failure to show proper equitable grounds) in Ernest v. Guebelle, 1 Colo. App. 199 (1891), since
equity will not interpose to prevent an individual from doing a foolish
act when he does it at his own expense, or to prevent illegal voting. Allegations that voters have been illegally imported for purposes of the election are insufficient as equity will not prevent a perpetration of a felony
or a misdemeanor.3
If they voted in violation of laws, they could be
properly punished after the offense was committed; moreover, if the election proceeded without judicial interference and the prophecies had been
fulfilled, the remedies at law or equity would be sufficient. (But see note
42, infra.)
Nor can individuals restrain a canvass of the returns or certify the
results of a municipal election, though the election was illegal, since the
'Lawrence on Equity Jurisprudence (1929), p. 74.
'In an action* brought upon service by publication against 24,000 registered
voters without a list of addresses to determine their legal status to qualify as such, it
was held that the status of all the defendants making appearance could be determined
by the court; the decision is apparently based on this and other Colorado cases hereinafter discussed. The dissenting opinion, analyzing the Colorado decisions, said:
"If, today, without due process of law the vested right of the qualified citizen to
exercise his franchise at the polls is taken from him without due process of law, the
vested right of ownership of property may be taken away." Pierce et al. v. Superior
Court in and for Los Angeles County, 37 P. (2nd) 453 (1934) ; see also same case,
37 P. (2nd) 460. It is to be noted that actions in Colorado were against officials and
not against voters.
'But see State ex rel. Smith, Atty. Gen. et al. v. McMahon et al., 128 Kans. 772,
280 P. 906, 66 A. L. R. 1072 (1929) ; Commonwealth v. McGovern, 116 Ky. 212,
75 S. W. 261, 66 L. R. A. 280 (1903).
If the suit is brought on behalf of the
people, jurisdiction should be extended to prevent fraud, multiplicity of suits, and
unwarranted expense to taxpayers. (See notes 24, 25, supra.) The decision at page
202 casts doubt on whether there was lack of jurisdiction in the strict sense. See in
accord with the Colorado case, 32 C. J. 41, note 98; compare with People v. Tool,
35 Colo. 225, 86 P. 224, petition instituted in the supreme court, acts enjoined
to prevent perversion of an election, though such acts if committed would be criminal.
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question is purely political and not judicial, and hence equity has no
jurisdiction to inhibit this power, even though the complainant may
suffer a pecuniary loss pending a determination of the validity of a franchise by quo warranto proceedings. 3' Likewise, the district court is
without jurisdiction to enjoin the county clerk from certifying and having printed on official ballots, names of candidates for county commissioners. 2
By a peculiar construction placed on the Colorado Constitution, the
Colorado Supreme Court has held 33 that the state may through its attorney general apply to the Supreme Court for an injunction to restrain the
consummation of a conspiracy to violate the election laws by padding
registration lists, permitting falsified returns. That the court in so doing
is exercising a judicial and not a political function by enforcing statutes
relating to elections, is a position held by few courts. 34 Whether or not
equity's power to supervise elections by injunctions in restraining officers
canvassing fraudulent returns is based on any recognizable rule of equity
jurisprudence,3 5 the decision seems sound from a practical view. "The
cardinal principle of our government is that it shall be controlled by the
people through the medium of the ballot box. Destroy this right and
the government itself is destroyed. The people are entitled to have an
election honestly conducted and the ballots honestly counted * * *
The true precedent is the correct principle applicable to the particular
facts of a particular case."- 36 It is clearly established that such suits cannot be maintained by individuals, but must be by the state in its sovereign
capacity as parens patriae to protect its citizens when they are incompe-

tent to act for themselves, since the matters involved are strictly public
and not private. Furthermore, such suits can only be instituted7 in the
Supreme Court, since district courts are without jurisdiction.3 The
Supreme Court by Art. 6, Par. 3 of the Colorado Constitution is given
the right to issue high prerogative writs of the common law, which right
is not possessed by the district courts under Art. 6, Par. 11, and therefore
the latter cannot control or supervise elections even though a property
right may be involved . 3 The only limitation upon this power is evidently one of feasibility in carrying out the decree, and thus it is doubtful
if a decree would be entered against others than officials, the voters as a
group being difficult to bind by a court decree. "In determining whether
a court of equity can take jurisdiction, one of the questions is what it can
"Vickery v. Wilson, 40 Colo. 490, 90 P. 1034 (1907); Fletcher v. Tuttle,
151 111.41, 37 N. E. 683 (1894).
"Sherlock v. District Court, 39 Colo. 41, 88 P. 396 (1907).
Relief, however, was probably denied on grounds that no protests were filed within the statutory
time alloived for such purposes, in protest to the nomination of the candidates.
"People v. Tool, 35 Colo. 225, 117 Am. St. Rep. 198, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 822,
86 P. 224 (1905).
"Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, Vol. 4 (4th Ed., 1919), p. 4073.
'J. Steele's dissenting opinion in People ex rel. Graves v. District Court, 37 Colo.
443, 92 P. 958 (1906).
'People v. Tool, 35 Colo. 225. 232, 233, 86 P. 224 (1905).
"These limitations were not announced in the Tool case, but were decided in
People v. District Court, 37 Colo. 443, 86 P. 87, 92 P. 958 (1906).
"Note 36, supra; Aichele v. The People, 40 Colo. 482. 90 P. 1122 (1907).
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do to enforce any orders it may make * * * the court has little practical
power to deal with the people of a state in a body." 39
Though a district court cannot assume jurisdiction over and supervise a state and county election, though it probably may do so as to municipal elections, it has jurisdiction over matters preliminary to the election,
such as fraudulent alterations of initiative petitions, 40 or cancellation of
certification of fraudulent registration lists."1 In an action to enjoin the
county clerk from issuing fraudulent and fictitious lists by voters to
election judges, equity can render harmless such illegal acts, and in so
doing is in no sense supervising or controlling the conduct of an election.
Likewise, the district court has proper jurisdiction to restrain election
judges from striking qualified voters,'42 or by mandamus to compel insertion of names in registration books. Moreover, in a suit brought on a
proposition to vote bonds, modified one week before election in such a
manner as to become a new proposition, the election being illegal since
there would not be sufficient time to give notice required by law, the
district
court was held to have jurisdiction, by dicta, to enjoin the elec3
tion.4

In summation, equitable intervention will be denied in Colorado:
(1) when the sole object is to try title to a public office, though temporary restraining orders may issue until such is established by quo warranto proceedings; (2) to restrain a discretionary executive act; (3) by
the district courts to control or supervise state or county elections; (4)
to enjoin canvassing of returns of illegal municipal elections, since there
is an adequate remedy at law. Equity will intervene: (1) to relieve
against results of fraudulent elections under its inherent equitable powers; the existence of a "property right" as a requisite for jurisdiction is
doubtful; (2) to restrain illegal acts and unwarranted, malicious orders
of officials; (3) upon petition on behalf of the state instituted in the
Supreme Court, to supervise and control county and state elections; (4)
through the district courts to control fraudulent preliminaries to elections; (5) to enjoin waste of public monies, on petition in behalf of all
taxpayers. Equity probably has jurisdiction: (1) to enjoin illegal
municipal elections by the district courts on proof of fraud, irreparable
injury, and inadequate remedy at law; (2) to restrain passage of an unconstitutional municipal ordinance on showing of immediate irreparable
damage.'4
GEORGE J. ROBINSON.
'Giles v. Harris, 189 U. S. 475 (1902).
'Elkins
80 Colo.
135,482,
249 90
P. P.
6551122
(1926).
'Aichele v.v.Milliken,
The People,
40 Colo.
(1907).
'People v. District Court, 33 Colo. 16, 78 P. 684 (1904).
"Packard et al. v. County Commissioners of Jefferson Co., 2 Colo. 338 (1874)
the suit was dismissed on other grounds, note 24, supra. For cases in accord with
enjoining an illegal or unconstitutional election, see Harries v. McCrea, 219 P. 533;
Hawke v. Smith, 253 U. S. 221, 40 Sup. Ct. R. 495, 10 A. L. R. 1504 (1920).
The main case is not in conflict with Sherlock v. District Court (note 31, supra),
since in that case there was an adequate means of protesting the nomination which the
complainant had not pursued. Dicta in Ernest Guebelle v. John J. Epley (ibid, note
23), on showing of fraud, insufficient notice, irreparable injury, the district court could
enjoin a municipal election.
"As a possible and sound limitation in addition to all such actions, see note 28 and
material supported by note 38.

THE RELUCTANT TAXPAYER
HIS REMEDY BY INJUNCTION

T

HERE are few of us who are not reluctant taxpayers, but some of us
wish to voice that reluctance by enjoining the collection of taxes,
rather than paying and then suing for a refund. It is for those who
wish to employ the injunction that this article is written, to show the
taxpayer what he may expect at the present time, in view of the vacillating course the courts have run in the past. The situation as to Federal
taxes will be considered first and then the situation as to Colorado taxes.
In 1867, as an amendment [which is still effective today] to the
Revenue Act of 1866, a statute was passed of a prohibitory nature providing, "And no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or
collection of a tax shall be maintained in any courts."'
The courts immediately commended the policy behind the enactment of this statute, but in several early cases denying an injunction, the
court began its policy of distinction and reservation under the statute
and indicated that the reluctant taxpayer's action would be successful if
the actions of the collector were so capricious that the court
would regard
2
the threatened imposition as a nullity rather than a tax.
A later distinction was approved by the Supreme Court in Lipke v.
Lederer,3 where the court denied that the statute forbade an injunction
against penalties as distinguished from taxes. The use of this distinction
should be confined to cases where the punitive element of the statute
clearly appears, otherwise the statute would lose its significance.
These cases, however, throw no light on the question as to how a
tax expressly within the prohibitory law will be treated. Pullan v. Kinsinger,4 the second case decided under the statute, treated it as merely a
reenactment of the old equity rule, denying relief where there was an
adequate remedy at law.5 This construction was later urged on the
Supreme Court in Dodge v. O6born.6 In that case the court found no
grounds for equitable jurisdiction and clearly indicated that equity jurisdiction alone was not sufficient to nullify the statute. It concluded with
the significant statement that the provisions could not be avoided, "Unless by some extraordinary and entirely exceptional circumstance, its provisions are not applicable."
Six years later these words were repeated in Bailey v.George,7 which
also denied injunctive relief. Late in the same year a case of great hardship, Hill v. Wallace,8 was presented. It arose under the Future Trading
Act, whereby grain exchanges were forced to submit to regulation by
'14 Stat. 475 (1867). 26 U. S.C. A. 154 (1928), R. S. Sec. 3224.
'Pullan v. Kinsinger, 20 Fed., Case No. 11,463 (C. C. S. D. Ohio 1870); Kinsinger v. Bean, 14 Fed., Case No. 7853 (C. C. E. D. Wis. 1875).
'259 U. S.557, Accord; Regal Drug Corp. v.Wardell, 260 U. S.386.
'20 Fed., Case No. 11,463 (C. C. S. D. Ohio 1870).
51 Stat. 82 (1789), 28 U. S. C. A. 384 (1928).
'240 U. S. 118 (1910).
'259 U. S.44 (1922).
'259 U. S.16, 20 (1922).
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the Secretary of Agriculture or sustain a prohibitive tax., Any action
which the exchanges could have taken, aside from obtaining an injunction, would practically have ruined their futures business. Impressed by
this fact, the court seized on the hitherto lifeless phrase, and granted an
injunction on the grounds that the circumstances were "exceptional and
extraordinary." The court considered as one element in the conclusion
the multiplicity of suits incident to recovering taxes on each of numerous
daily transactions. An analysis of this case in a Harvard Law Review
article indicated that the court treated "exceptional circumstances" as
being synonymous with multiplicity of suits. 10
In Graham v. Dupont" the circumstances were again unusual. The
taxpayer's remedy for a refund was barred by the statute of limitations.
The court denied the injunction and stated that the Hill case was not in
point because in that case a penalty was involved. But the more recent
decision of Miller v. Standard Nut Margarine Company1 2 indicates that
there may be other situations in which the court will be unwilling to
apply the restriction of the statute. The tax involved in the Margarine
case was of a prohibitory nature similar to that in Hill v. Wallace, hence
on its facts it might seem to go no further than Hill v. Wallace. Justice
Butler, however, in granting the injunction, asserted that the statute was
merely declaratory of the pre-existing common law. In the absence of
statutes, courts of equity would not enjoin the collection of a tax merely
on the grounds of illegality, but if an independent basis of equity jurisdiction existed, relief would be granted. What the Federal courts consider to be the common law on this subject is shown by their decisions in
cases where they have enjoined the collection of state taxes, in states
where there were no statutes. They have enjoined the collection of an
illegal tax if the taxpayer had no adequate remedy at law, or if the collection would lead to a multiplicity of suits'" or throw a cloud on title to
realty. 4
If the implications of the Margarine case are followed and the statute treated as merely declaratory, the result may be a considerable enlargement of the field in which the reluctant taxpayer may succeed by way of
injunction against the collection of a Federal tax.
In this state of the authorities, Congress passed the Agriculture
Adjustment Act 5 authorizing the collection of processing taxes, which
resulted in more than 1,600 cases in the courts seeking injunctions.
When Congress passed an amendment to this Act' 6 which would deny

recovery for taxes already due, there was an unprecedented rush for
injunctive relief. In acting upon these bills, no courts went so far as to
say that Section 3224 was without exception. Some U. S. District Court
'42 Stat. 187 (1921).
137 Harv. Law Review 255, 258.

"262 U. S. 234 (1923).
-384 U. S.498 (1932).
"Travis v. Yale and Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U. S. 60 (1920).
"Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Cheyenne, 113 U. S. 516 (1885).
1148 Stat. 31 (1933), 7 U. S. C. A. 601-22 (1934).
"79 Cong. Rec., June 18, 1935, at 1991.
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judges thought that Miller v. Nut Margarine Company required more
than ordinary grounds of equitable jurisdiction before Section 3224
could be disregarded, and since complainants could not show impending
ruin, injunctive relief was refused. 1 7 To others the same case defined
Section 3224 as a restatement of the old equity rule and upon a showing
of a threatened multiplicity of suits or other inadequacy of the legal
remedy, they granted the injunction."" A third group of district courts
cited the Margarine case for the proposition that injunctions would issue
only in extraordinary and exceptional cases and then proceeded to restrain collection upon mere proof of inadequacy of the legal remedy.1 9
The policy of the Federal Government in collecting taxes of all
types has been to require payment before the determination of the validity of the taxing law. The law provides that Federal taxes are collectible by distraint without resort to the courts. 20 Hence, the taxpayer's
only remedy was to pay under protest and then sue for the refund. The
necessity for payment under protest was generally adhered to. 21 This
practice justifies the position of the reluctant taxpayer and tends to work
a very great hardship, because deficiency assessments are so large as to
cause bankruptcy or a sale of a large portion of the taxpayer's assets before validity of the tax is determined, and in any case a refund would not
compensate for the damage occasioned by collection of the illegal tax.
There is no sound reason for this policy of government, since it obtains
no advantage in making collections it is going to return later.
These objections became the more forceful when income and estate
taxes became the principal source of government revenue, since complexities involved made disputes more numerous. To meet this situation, in22
1924 a separate tribunal named the Board of Tax Appeals was created
to pass upon the validity of deficiency assessments, before payment was
demanded, although either party could have a later review by the courts.
The Board's findings were in most cases accepted by the court. Popularity of the Board led to the extension of its powers.
Collection of the
assessed tax was made subject to injunction at the suit of the taxpayer,
pending the Board's decision. This is a specific exception to Section
3224. The Board's decisions were made final, though either party had
the right to a review of the record by the Circuit Court of Appeals or
the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, from which the case
might be carried to the Supreme Court on certiorari.
But this procedure was only applicable to income and estate taxes.
The statutory procedure for the collection of other Federal taxes remains
unaltered except as changed by judicial decision.
"Colo. Mill and Elev. Co. v. Nicholas (D. Colo. July 23, 1935).

"Gold Medal Foods, Inc. v. Landy, 11 F Supp. 65 (D. Minn. 1935).
"Danahy Packing Co. v. McGowan, 11 F Supp. 920 (W. D. N. Y., July 27
1935).
2026 U. S. C. A. 116, 20, 25.
'Cheesebrough v. U. S., 192 U. S. 253 (1904).

"26 U. S. C. A. 1048-54, 1100-4, 1211-22 (1926).
226 U. S. C. A. 1224-28 (1928).
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A practical evasion of Section 3224 by our reluctant taxpayer has
resulted by the indirect method of a court's issuing an injunction restraining payment of the tax at the suit of a stockholder against a corporation. 2 4 Since a suit for a refund can rarely be maintained unless the payment was made under protest, equity will lend its aid to prevent a voluntary payment which would be in the nature of a breach of trust. This
same principle was applied in the case of the beneficiary of a trust enjoining a trustee from paying an illegal tax voluntarily. 25 The legality of
the tax is one of the issues involved in such a suit. These cases are reconcilable only on the theory that they restrict "payment" rather than
"assessment" or "collection," the practical result being to evade the Act.
In Colorado, as in the Federal courts, the right to an injunction has
revolved around the interpretation of a statute but, unlike the Federal
statute, Colorado
provides a mode of recovery rather than denying in26

junctive relief.
"Each county is responsible to the state for the full amount of tax
levied for state purposes, excepting such amounts as are certified to be
unavailable, double or erroneous assessments, as provided in the Revenue
Act of 1902, and in all cases where anyone shall pay any tax, interest or
cost, or any portion thereof, that shall thereafter be found to be erroneous or illegal, whether the same be due to erroneous assessment, to improper or irregular levying of the tax, or clerical, or other error or irregularities, the Board of County Commissioners shall refund the same without abatement or discount to the taxpayer."
From the beginning, Colorado equity courts have held that this
statute furnished an adequate legal remedy. 27 They said the statute created a completely new statutory right for the purpose of testing the legality of all types of taxing statutes. This remedy is available in Federal
courts as well as state courts, 28 since it has been interpreted to create a
new substantive right in the taxpayer. In fact, the Federal courts have
gone so far as to say it2 supplanted
the remedy equity previously afforded
9
the reluctant taxpayer.
While on its face this statute seems broad enough to relieve the
reluctant taxpayer, yet in its interpretation the express wording has been
afforded little significance, so that the errors and irregularities have come
to mean simple illegality.ao Hence, when the question is one as to
whether or not an assessment is too high, the statute is not of much help
and efforts should be made to'obtain relief from various administrative
bodies, including the assessor, the county commissioners, and the tax
commission, as provided by statute.
The necessity for exhausting administrative remedies is emphasized

in City and County of Denver v. Boettcher,"1 where pleading under Sec"Pollock v. Farmers Loan and Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429 (1895).
'Weeks v. Sibley, 269 Fed. 155 (N. D. Tex. 1920).
"35 C. S. A., Ch. 142, Sec. 281.

'Price v. Kramer, 4 Colo. 546.
"Singer Sewing Mach. Co. v. Benedict, 229 U. S. 481.
'Idem.
"South Broadway National Bank v. Denver, 51 Fed. (2d) 703.
"99 Colo. 408.
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tion 281 was held defective because of petitioner's failure to state that
administrative remedies had been exhausted. What constitutes exhausting administrative remedies, however, is explained in Goldsmith, County
Treasurer v. Standard Chemical Co.,32 where it is said that the statutory
procedure need only be followed through the administrative officer as, in
that case, the assessor; and if he refuses relief, appeal to a court need not
be taken from his ruling, but a suit may be brought directly under Section 281, previously quoted. This will no doubt be followed by our
Supreme Court.
Our court has recognized that there might be exceptions to the
statute33 which would give the reluctant taxpayer the right to go into
equity. "We do not hold that this section affords an adequate remedy
to the taxpayer, in all cases founded upon an erroneous or illegal tax.
We readily conceive that a case might arise in which complainant would
not have an adequate remedy by an action at law based on this section."
The court went on to say that, "In addition to illegality, hardship or
irregularity the case must be brought within some of the recognized
foundations of equitable jurisdiction, and mere errors or excess in valuation or hardship or injustices of the law, or any grievances which can be
rendered in a suit at law, either before or after payment of taxes, will not
justify a court of equity to interpose by injunction to stay collection of
a tax."
It has been held that the mathematical difficulty of giving the case
to a jury was no grounds for
equity to act by injunction, though it
34
might properly hear the case.
There are circumstances under which the enforcement of the right
given by this section would lead to results against which equity will grant
relief.3 5 An example is found in the situation wherein the Boards of
Equalization were about to certify to a large number of counties, taxes
which were shown to be illegal. When thus certified it became the duty
of local officers to enforce their payment. Complainants, to avail themselves of this section, would have been compelled to maintain a large
number of independent suits at law, and the right to go into equity is
based upon grounds of preventing this multiplicity of suits.
When a statute like that in Colorado exists, complainants seeking
to restrain the collection of a tax must do more than show some of the
equitable circumstances which would support resort to equity if there
were no statute. It seems necessary to make out a case of an exceptional
character such as appears in Cummings v. National Bank, 3 which is cited
with approval in many decisions under our statute. The Supreme Court
said that compliance with the statute in that case would have resulted in
"irreparable injury."
'2 3 F (2nd) 313.
'Board of County Commissioners v. A.
"Union Pac. v. County Commissioners,
'Taylor v. Louisville, etc. R. Co., 88 F
quoted in 222 F at 657 in U. P. v. Board of
"101 U. S. 153.

T. 10 S. F. R. R. Co., 52 Colo. 609, 614.
222 Fed. 651.
350 and Fargo v. Hart, 193 U. S. 490, as
Commissioners.
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Tallon v. Vindicator Consolidated Gold Mining Company3 7 laid
down the general principle that with few exceptions a tax must be prima
facie void before equity will act by granting an injunction.
The latest expression by our Supreme Court on the subject was in
Fairlamb v. Bowle, " in which the court held the method of assessment
proper and denied the injunction, saying that the remedy at law was
adequate.
The question arises as to whether or not it is still necessary, as it
was at common law, to pay taxes under protest in order that the taxpayer
will be entitled to sue for a refund in case of illegality. It would seem
unnecessary under the statute and was so held in a circuit court case, 9
but as yet our Supreme Court has not ruled upon the question, except
incidentally, 40 where the court allowed recovery though there had been
no protest, but the case did not comment upon the lack of "protest" as
a grounds of defense. On the other hand, in Holly Sugar Corporation
v. Board of Commissioners,4 1 the Federal court in commenting on the
procedure under the statute, says it is the duty of a property owner,
where there has been a levy of an excessive tax, to pay under protest and
bring an action against the county to recover the same. Colorado cases
are cited in accord. 42 Since the question of protest was not involved in
these cases, it would seem that what the court says is only directory and
would represent a safe procedure to follow, and one which is followed
in most cases.
ROBERT A. THEOBALD.
'59 Colo. 316, 339.

'101 Colo. 135.

'Union Pacific v. Board of Commissioners, 222 F 651.
'"City of Denver v. Evans, Administratrix, 35 Colo. 490.
"10 F (2nd) 506.
'Spaulding

Mfg. Co. v. Board of Commissioners, 63 Colo. 438; Kendrick v.

A. Y., etc. Milling Co., 63 Colo. 214.

NEGLIGENCE-AUTOMOBILES-LAST CLEAR CHANCE DOCTRINE-

Independent Lumber Company vs. Leatherwood-No. 14198Decided February 14, 1938-District Court of Mesa CountyHon. Straud M. Logan, Judge-Affirmed.
HELD: 1. A failure to exercise ordinary care for another's
safety which operates as the proximate cause of injury to him is the
legal theory on which recovery is permitted in negligence cases.
2. The last clear chance doctrine is a rule applied for the purpose of determining the legal proximate cause of the injury.
3. Where plaintiff's automobile proceeds into a stop street and
defendant drives truck from the left, and the two collide, and both
parties are nigligent, the invoking of the last clear chance doctrine requires examination of the evidence to determine whether the situation
created by the plaintiff's contributory negligence, which situation the
event established beyond peradventure was one of peril, was a situation of which ordinary care on the part of the defendant's driver would
have made him cognizant in time to have avoided injury to the plaintiff by ordinary care in using the means available to avoid injuring him.
4. Evidence examined and it is determined that the jury was
warranted in finding that ordinary care on the part of defendant's
driver would have discovered to him the plaintiff's position of helpless peril in time to have avoided the accident by exercising ordinary
care to stop or turn his truck.
5. Section 479 of the Restatement of the Law of Torts correctly
states the rule of last clear chance as applied in Colorado to situations
in which the plaintiff's failure to exercise ordinary care for his own
safety brings him into a position of peril from which he cannot extricate himself, but one such that ordinary care on the part of the defendant after the dangerous situation arises would save the plaintiff
from harm.
6. Section 480 of the Restatement of the Law of Torts is not
the rule in Colorado. EN BANC.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Young.
QUIET TITLE-MINING PROCESS-UNKNOWN PARTIES-Mulvey vs.
San Juan Metals Corporation-No. 14190-Decided January
17, 1938-District Court of Ouray County-Hon. George W.
Bruce, Judge-Reversed.
HELD:
1. Where a quiet title suit is brought and names unknown parties who claim an interest in the subject matter as defendants, one of such parties whose name is not mentioned specifically as
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a defendant, has, within the time permitted by law and as stated in
the publication of summons, the right to file his answer and present
and be heard upon his claim.
2. Where his answer is stricken and he files a petition in intervention as ordered by the trial Court, he does not waive his statutory
right to appear and answer.
3. One who appears in response to a published summons, at
once becomes a party. It is not necessary for him to obtain leave to
defend.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland. Mr. Chief Justice Burke, Mr.
Justice Hilliard and Mr. Justice Bakke concur.

WILLS-BEQUESTS TO DECEASED LEGATEE-Bacon et at. vs. Kitely,
etc., et a.-No. 14015-Decided January 17, 1938-County

Court of Denver-Hon. George A. Luxford, Judge-Reversed.
HELD:
1. A legacy lapses by the death of the legatee, in
testator's lifetime, if no successor be named.
2. In the interpretation of wills, the intent of the testator governs.

3.

In case of a bequest to discharge a debt, it does not lapse

upon death of legatee in testator's lifetime for the testator intended to
pay a debt, not to make a gift. This also applies to debts barred by

the Statute of Limitations, or which rest upon moral obligations alone;
and the heirs of the deceased legatee are entitled to the bequest. EN
BANC.
Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Burke. Mr. Justice Bouck and
Mr. Justice Bakke dissent.
CHATTEL MORTGAGES-PRIORITY---SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGSREPLEVIN-Stokes vs. Kirk-No. 14126-Decided January 17,

1938-District Court of Denver-Hon. Otto Bock, Judge-Affirmed.
1. "* * * If a chattel mortgage provides, * * * that
HELD:
the mortgagor may retain possession of the mortgage property, the
mortgagee is invested with legal title only, but on default, the right
of possession of the mortgagor is forfeited to and vests in the mortgagee for the purpose of sale, subject only to the right of redemption
by mortgagor pending sale or for an accounting of the proceeds thereof."
2. "Where the debt represented by a chattel mortgage is paid
or discharged, the title or interest transferred by the mortgage is extinguished and with the extinguishment of the mortgage the right of
the mortgagee to possession terminates."
3. "* * * on payment of the debt secured by a first mortgage, a
second mortgage on the same property becomes eo instanti a prior lien
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and the holder of the second mortgage is entitled to the possession of
the mortgaged property according to the terms of his mortgage."
4. Itis within the discretion of the trial Court to permit the
filing of supplemental pleadings alleging full payment of the first
mortgage pendente lite.
5. Trial Court may in its discretion, in a proper case, permit
the filing of supplemental pleadings after remand by the Supreme
Court, and such a proper case is one in which the Supreme Court determines a question of priority of lien and thereafter it developes that
the prior lien has been extinguished. EN BANC.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous. Mr. Justice Holland dissenting.
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